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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL ROBERT OSBORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44965
Ada County Case No.
CR-2016-24383

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Osborn failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing an aggregate, unified sentence of 36 years, with 17 years fixed, upon his guilty pleas to
burglary, assault on a correctional officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of
intimidating a witness, and petit theft, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Osborn Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Osborn pled guilty to burglary, assault on a correctional officer, unlawful possession of a
firearm, two counts of intimidating a witness, and petit theft and the district court imposed an
aggregate, unified sentence of 36 years, with 17 years fixed, and ordered that the sentence run
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concurrently with Osborn’s sentences in three other cases. (R., pp.136-41.) Osborn filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.144-46.) He also filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.156-64, 19094.)
Osborn asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of his substance abuse, desire for treatment, mental health issues, and support of
family and friends. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) Osborn has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
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reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for burglary is 10 years; the maximum prison sentence for
assault on a correctional officer is 25 years; and unlawful possession of a weapon and felony
intimidating a witness both carry a maximum sentence of five years.

I.C. §§ 18-1403, -

915(1)(a), -3316(1), -2604, -112. The district court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years,
with four years fixed, for burglary; 10 years, with eight years fixed, for aggravated assault on a
law enforcement officer; five years fixed for unlawful possession of a firearm; and five years,
with zero years fixed, for each count of intimidating a witness, all of which fall within the
statutory guidelines. 1 (R., pp.136-41.) Osborn’s sentence is reasonable in light of his ongoing
decisions to endanger others and his failure to rehabilitate.
Osborn’s criminal record demonstrates his disregard for the law, the terms of community
supervision, and the well-being of others. Osborn’s first felony conviction was for discharging a
firearm at a house, occupied building, or vehicle in 2003 and he was sentenced to a period of
retained jurisdiction, which he did not successfully complete. (PSI, pp.7-9.) After being paroled
in December of 2005, Osborn was convicted of robbery in 2006 and sentenced to 25 years in
prison. (PSI, pp.7, 9.) Osborn was placed on parole in February 2014, and an agent’s warrant
for a parole violation was issued in September of 2014. (PSI, p.9.) Osborn was released from
incarceration in June 2015, and a warrant was again issued the very next month. (PSI, p.9.)

1

The court also imposed a consecutive indeterminate one-year jail sentence for petit theft. (R.,
p.137.)
3

After another period of incarceration, Osborn was placed on parole in February 2016, and two
months later he committed the crimes of burglary and grand theft in case number 44964. (PSI,
p.9.) He committed the crimes of which he was convicted in this case just four months later.
(PSI, pp.7-9.) Osborn also committed multiple disciplinary offenses while in incarcerated,
including: disrespect to a commanding officer, intent to injure, group disruption, sexual activity,
outside of authorized boundaries, horse play, battery, unauthorized transfer of property, and
disobedience to orders. (PSI, pp.62-75.) Osborn’s desire for treatment and support from family
and friends do not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, his demonstrated inability or
unwillingness to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law, and the need for
community protection.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Osborn’s sentence. (3/13/17 Tr., p.49, L.15 –
p.53, L.7.) The district court specifically recognized Osborn’s “mental-health issues and … very
pervasive drug addiction” but determined the sentenced it imposed was necessary for the
protection of society, reasoning, “[W]hile mental health can be a mitigating factor, when the
result is this time of violent conduct, it is also an aggravating factor that weighs in favor of
needing treatment that’s only available in an incarcerated setting to actually protect the public.”
(3/15/17 Tr., p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.1.) The state submits that Osborn has failed to establish that
his sentence is excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Osborn next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he is maintaining his sobriety in prison and is
enrolled in school. (Appellant’s brief, p.5-6.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits,
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a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews
the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159
P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Osborn must “show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of
the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Osborn has failed to satisfy his burden.
The district court considered the information Osborn provided with respect to his sobriety
and enrollment in school, but found the information did not warrant any reduction of Osborn’s
sentence, reasoning, “Although these are commendable endeavors, the Defendant has not alleged
any new facts or evidence sufficient to demonstrate leniency may be appropriate. Defendant has
been given several opportunities for rehabilitation prior to the event of this case and each time
has reoffended.” (R., p.194.) The district court was correct. While Osborn’s latest rehabilitative
efforts are commendable, they do not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, the danger
Osborn presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and appropriately concluded
that Osborn’s sentence was appropriate because “the actions of [the] Defendant have shown a
pattern of behavior that is dangerous to society which is the primary consideration in
sentencing.” (R., p.194.) Osborn has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence
simply because he has maintained his sobriety and is enrolled in school. Given any reasonable
view of the facts, Osborn has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Osborn’s conviction and sentences and
the district court’s order denying Osborn’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 29th day of November, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of November, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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Case No. CR01-2016-30 824

what's bought us all here is my choices combined with me
using the drugs, and I'm just -- I am -- I haven't maybe
in the past been ve1-y accountable.
In one of the situations that Mr. Dinger
referenced in 2006, I w11sn't. However, I do feel on
these situations I have been, and I do acknowledge what
my part in everything was and that I was wrong, and I
don't make an excuse for it, and I am sorry that the
things that I did took place. That's all I have to say.
THE.COURT: Thnnkyou.
Does either party have any legal cause why
sentence cannot be imposed?
MR. DINGER: No.
MR. NONA: No, Judge.
Tl-tE COURT: In this case, I've considered the
factors which I'm required to consider, which includes
the protection of society, the deterrence of crime, the
rehabilitation of the offender as well as punishment.
I've also considered the criteria for placing someone on
probation or imposing imprisonment under 19-2521.
This case is one of those difficult cases where
the evidence related to mitigation is also the evidence
related to aggravation, where he obviously has
substantial mental-health issue,s. I don't find that the
PTSD and other issues derive from his military service
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in that he !.-pends only about six months in the military,
was medically discharged for an injw-y at basic
training, so this isn't a service-induced mental-health
issues and whether they're derive from his time in
custody or from other aspects, the record is complicated
to say the least.
But what is clear is that this was a violent act
of entering for the burglary. He entered with the
intent to actually scare the re.'3idents into paying this
debt, and as a result of that behavior, then becomes
this violent interaction with the police officers. The
clear record that he should not have a firearm because
of prior instances, and then after all of that is
certainly aggravated with the two intimidating witness
charges.
So while 1 do agree he docs have mental-health
issues and a very pervasive drug addiction, when I
consider all of the factors that I have to consider, the
primary factor that is the court's concern is protection
of society, and when he acts in a violent way against
law-enforceme nt and other people, while mental health
can be a mitigating factor, when the result is t his time
of violent conduct, it is also an aggravating factor
that weighs in favor of needing treatment that's only
available in an incarcerated setting to actually protect

so
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So in this particular case, I'm going to impose
a judgment of conviction on all counts. The sentences
in this case will run consecutive to eacb other.
However, each one of these sentences will run
concurrently with CR-FE-2016-4 203, CR-FE-2002-7 97 and
CR-FE-2006-431. To the extent that each one of these
are consecutive sentences, he will also be given credit
for time served under current law for each count, and 1
calculate his current credit for time se1ved on each
count in this case to be 220 days.
On Count 1, the burglai-y, I'm going to enter a
judgment of conviction with 4 years fixed, 6 years
indeterminate for a total of 10 years. On Count 2, the
aggravated assault 011 a law-enforceme nt officer, I'll
enter a judgment of conviction with 8 years fixed, 2
years indeterminate for a total of 10 years that will
run consecutively. On Count 3, the unlawful possession
of a firearm, I'll enter a sentence of 5 years fixed
that will consecutively. On Count 4, the intimidating a
witness, 111 enter a judgment of conviction with zero
years fixed, 5 years indeterminate that will run
consecutively. On Count 5, intimidating a witness, I'll
enter zero years fixed, 5 years indeterminate that would
run consecutively. On Count 6, the petty theft, a
51
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misdemeanor, I'll enter 1 year indeterminate, which will
run consecutively, so, with that, that is a total of a
17-year sentence that's fixed, 19 that are indeterminate
for a total of 36 years with credit for time se1ved of
220 days on each count.
So in my calculation, Mr. Osborn will actually
be eligible for parole slightly before he turns the age
of 50. I recognize that that is a substantial period of
incarceration, but given the nature of this offense and it's not this offense. It is these offenses because
each one were separate offenses, and while I appreciate
the fact that they could have been derived from a drug
addiction, there are those that are involved with drugs
that do not have that continuing course of conduct to
continue to commit crime.s even after the first clime is
committed.
And so I recognize in fashioning this sentence,
he will be slightly before his 50 bilthday before he
will be eligible for parole. Whether he is eligible for
parole will depend on his behavior and bis conduct
within the institution, and that, for this particular
sentence, he would then be 68 years old whenever he was
off supe1vision, which recognizing that 67 is probably
his age whe1·e he could qualify for social security if he
had enough qualifying years of work history to meet that
52
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1 social security age, and so l have actually considered
2 that in my calculation because I do think that
3 rehabilitation of the offender is important, given the
4 fact that he is still 1·elatively young but also weighing
5 it when I'm considering the violent nature of these
6 particular offenses and the importance of protecting
7 society as well.
I'm going to order court costs on each count.
8
9 I'm going to waive a fine. I will require him to submit
10 a DNA sample if the department of corrections wants
11 another sample because it is required under the statute,
12 but I'm not going to require him to pay for that sample
13 since he has previously submitted a sample. If the
14 state has an amended no contact order with the victim,
15 Stevie Christensen, I will extend that no contact order
16 to expire March 12 of 2053, which would be the
17 expiration of his sentence in this case. If he's
18 discharged early, then, obviously, that no contact order
19 would be effected by the commission of pardons and
20 paroles with that discharge.
And then also as part of the plea agreement, the
21
22 parties and agreed to an order of forfeiture of property
23 and payment of cash held in evidence to the Ada County
24 C,'lerk to pay any fines, fees, costs and restitution.
25 The cost in this particular case are only the court
53
1 Judge Reardon knows he needs to collect those materials.
MR. NONA: Yeah.
2
THE COURT: And I have a copy of the no contact
3
4 order.
Anything else we need to take up in this matter?
5
MR. DINGER: No. Thank you.
6
THE COURT: Thank you.
7
(Proceedings concluded.)
8
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Case No CRoi-2016-30824
costs on each count. To that extent, if the state wants
to submit a separate order, the state can submit a
separate order digitally and that would be signed by the
court.
Now, Mr. Osborn, this is a final judgment. You
have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The time for taking an appeal is 42 days from the date
thejudgment is made and filed. You may be represented
by counsel in bringing that appeal. First, if you
cannot afford to hire counsel for the appeal, you would
have to demonstrate that you're indigent under Title 19
of the Idaho Code, but if you were successful in tliat
demonstration, the court would appoint the state
appellate public defender to represent you and that
would also include the cost of the appeal.
If the parties printed any sentencing materials,
those can be returned to the court. Those materials
will be shredded because the official court file is tlie
digital record in this case.
MR. NONA: Judge, we only printed out one
version of the PSI, and can we keep this till Wednesday
and then surrender it to Judge Reardon?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. DINGER: The same for us. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Yes, please, make sure that
54
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